"I see in a definition the critic's equivalent of a lyric, or of an aria in opera. . . . when used in an essay . . . a definition so sums things up that all the properties attributed to the thing defined can be as though 'derived' from the definition. In actual development, the definition may be the last thing a writer hits upon. Or it may be formulated somewhere along the line. But logically it is prior to the observations it summarizes. Definitions are also the critic's equivalent of the lyric (though a poet may not think so!) in that the writer usually 'hits on them.' They are 'breakthroughs,' and thus are somewhat hard to come by. We should always keep trying for them--but they don't always seem to 'click'" (" ("Definition" 3).

So Kenneth Burke begins his "Definition of Human." Originally published as "Definition of Man," Burke's definition elucidates his mature views on human nature and language. Like so much of Burke's work, the essay consists of a series of inter-related statements, a critical machine, if you will, but it stops short of professing to be an absolute system. The clauses in the definition turn back upon themselves, to weave in and out of each other, and as much as the various statements about humanity clarify, they also show the utter complexity of this animal we call the human, and perhaps the impossibility of any kind of absolutely definitive definition.

In many ways, Burke's essay is a response to the impulse to define; definitions are only available to the symbol-using animal. It is only through language, through symbolic representations, that definitions can be made.  And in choosing one sort of definition over another, we reveal not only our uniquely human capacity to act as a species independent of genetic programming, as a species with a measure of free will, but we also reveal the peculiar quirks of our individual characters.  Indeed, this capacity for self-definition is what distinguishes us as a species.  As Burke says, "Inasmuch as definition is a symbolic act, it must begin by explicitly recognizing its formal grounding in the principal of definition as an act. In choosing any definition at all, one implicitly represents man as the kind of animal that is capable of definition (that is to say, capable of symbolic action)" (14).

We define things by distinguishing them from other things, by asserting what they are not. Burke distinguishes humanity from other animals by supplying various characteristics that are peculiar to us. He asserts, for example, in his first clause, that "Man is the symbol-using animal." By making this assertion, he implies that other animals do not use symbols. Yet there are countless examples of symbolic communication among non-humans. White-tailed deer raise their tails to signal danger to other deer; bees communicate the location of nectar bearing flowers to other bees through elaborate dances. Burke would distinguish between these activities and human activities, however, with the terms non-symbolic motion and symbolic action. The use of symbols among animals is unconscious, instinctive, genetically programmed. Instead of symbolic action, which implies conscious choice, animal communication is non-symbolic motion. The act of defining, of naming a thing, is a purely human activity, a symbolic act.

However, our impulse to define (or stated more broadly, our use of symbols) can also blind us. In "Terministic Screens," Burke examines the implications of our choosing certain terms instead of others in naming our world: "Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality" (45). Our terms function as filters, shaping and coloring what we see. These filters, or terministic screens, often are revealing. For example, without the terministic screen of a web browser, you would not be able to read this document. However, our screens can also blind us, predisposing us to think and see patterns in directions already determined by our choice of terms.  In web browsers, for example, the technological characteristics of the medium limit the kinds of experiences that we have.  The web lacks tactile and olfactory functions, and is primarily a visual medium.  In some ways, it encourages the separation between mind and body, between the viewer and the thing viewed, between our symbolic and our animal natures.

For Burke, perhaps the ultimate statement--the ultimate term from which all others follow--is his first clause, "Man is the symbol-using, symbol-making, symbol-misusing animal."

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